Van noodzakelijke subjectieve ervaringen met hun "view from somewhere" kúnnen we komen tot meer "objective view from nowhere", volgens Spinoza volgens

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Julia Borcherding, “A View from Nowhere? The Place of
Subjectivity in Spinoza’s Rationalism.” In:  


Jari Kaukua and Tomas
Ekenberg (eds.), Subjectivity
and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern
Philosophy.
Springer, 2016, 294pp., $129.00 (hbk), ISBN 9783319269122 –
Pages 235-261 –
books.google [dit hoofdstuk bij Springer]


In de inleiding schrijven de redacteuren:


In the following contribution, Julia Borcherding asks
whether there is room for subjectivity in Spinoza's decidedly rationalistic
metaphysics that aims to regard the whole of being sub specie aelernitatis. Through a close analysis of crucial
sections of the Ethics, Borcherding
shows that Spinoza moves subtly between strictly ratio-nalistic deduction and
empirical intuitions. In this way, subjectivity can be argued to have played an
important cpistemic role in the construction of Spinoza's monistic system.