Van noodzakelijke subjectieve ervaringen met hun "view from somewhere" kúnnen we komen tot meer "objective view from nowhere", volgens Spinoza volgens


Julia Borcherding, “A View from Nowhere? The Place of
Subjectivity in Spinoza’s Rationalism.” In:  

Jari Kaukua and Tomas
Ekenberg (eds.), Subjectivity
and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern
Springer, 2016, 294pp., $129.00 (hbk), ISBN 9783319269122 –
Pages 235-261 – [dit hoofdstuk bij Springer]

In de inleiding schrijven de redacteuren:

In the following contribution, Julia Borcherding asks
whether there is room for subjectivity in Spinoza's decidedly rationalistic
metaphysics that aims to regard the whole of being sub specie aelernitatis. Through a close analysis of crucial
sections of the Ethics, Borcherding
shows that Spinoza moves subtly between strictly ratio-nalistic deduction and
empirical intuitions. In this way, subjectivity can be argued to have played an
important cpistemic role in the construction of Spinoza's monistic system.