Michael Della Rocca kreeg nog eens gelegenheid het PSR-belang uit te leggen

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Zoals ik onlangs al blogde: “Metafysica en zelfs substantiebegrip weer helemaal
terug van weggeweest.” Ook bij de Cambridge University Press verscheen in
november vorig jaar een boek over metafysica met de ondertitel: de structuur
van de werkelijkheid begrijpen.


Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the
Structure of Reality
. Cambridge University Press, (nov.) 2012, 317pp.

[books.google]

Ook Spinoza's begrip van de structuur van de werkelijkheid komt aan bod:


Er kan maar één substantie zijn
Michael Della Rocca werd uitgenodigd nog eens
over de PSR bij Leibniz en Spinoza te schrijven. In de inleiding vatten de
redacteuren zijn hoofdstuk als volgt samen:


“Chapter 5 – 'Violations of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason (in Leibniz and Spinoza)'. Some important versions of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) state that everything (literally
everything; or every fact; or every truth; …) is grounded. The PSR, in one
form or another, notoriously played an important role in the philosophies of
Spinoza and Leibniz. Leibniz, for instance, endorsed the PSR friendly principle
that whenever some objects stand in a relation, the relation must be grounded in
some thing(s). Della Rocca argues (Section 5.1) that this principle led Leibniz
to the idealist conclusion that relations are grounded in a mind (ultimately,
in God's mind). Yet this conclusion is in conflict with Leibniz's own view that
certain relations are real and not merely ideal, e.g. creation and the causal
relation that links a substance and its states (Section 5.2). Leibniz is caught
in a dilemma: either deny that there are pluralities of objects standing in
relations, or deny the PSR friendly principle mentioned above. Della Rocca
defends the view (Section 5.3) that Spinoza is able to avoid the dilemma by
taking both horns, holding that multiplicities and relational states do not
exist fully but still enjoy existence to a lesser degree, and holding that some
relations do violate the PSR friendly principle, these violations being
nevertheless less than fully existent. Della Rocca finally argues (Section 5.4)
that Leibniz cannot adopt Spinoza's strategy, which ultimately relies on his
monism, i.e. the view that there (fully) exists only one substance — a view
which Della Rocca himself tentatively endorses.”