In dit blog neem ik het lemma ‘Essentia’ over dat Henri Krop
schreef voor de Continuum Companion to
Spinoza, waarbij ik tussen [ ] toelichtende opmerkingen plaats. Aan het
eind geef ik mijn commentaar op een commentaar van Mogens Laerke op dat lemma.
Essentia
Spinoza's definition of essence in Ethics 2 is complicated, running over more than three lines. It
says: 'to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing
is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily
taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived,
and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing'. According to
Gueroult (1974, pp. 27-8) its length and deviations from tradition and
Descartes (cf. PPC 2ax2) are due to the fact that only in part two, dealing
with finite things, did it become necessary to distinguish between cause and
essence, which by the Cartesian phrase 'that without which the thing can neither
be nor be conceived' are identified and coincide in God. Moreover, God, being
the cause of both the existence and essence of all things, would pertain to
their essence (E2p10s). Spinoza's definition also announces the crucial notion
of an individual essence, which is made explicit in Ethics 2, proposition 37.
[Voor de duidelijkheid: in E2p10s legt Spinoza uit waarom
hij deze wat omslachtige definitie gaf, om n.l. te bereiken dat – terwijl voor ieder duidelijk
is dat individuele dingen veroorzaakt worden door God en zonder God niet kunnen
zijn of gedacht worden – God toch niet gezien kan worden als tot hun wezen te
behoren.]