Kunnen God en de Idee van God één en hetzelfde ding zijn?


Kortom, gaat Alex Silverman [cf.] waar maken wat hij belooft?

Eergisteren attendeerde Chris Meyns in een tweet
op het volgende aangekondigde artikel van

Alex Silverman, The Nature and Scope of Spinoza's "One
and the Same" Relation. In:  Res Philosophica 94 (forthcoming)

I argue that we should rethink
the nature and scope of Spinoza’s “one and the same” relation (E2p7s). Contrary
to the standard reading, the nature of this relation is not identity but a
union, and its scope includes all idea-object pairs, even God and the idea of
God. A crucial reason we should adopt this dual picture is that the idea of God
must be one and the same as something found when Nature is conceived under the
other attributes. If “one and the same” is interpreted as a relation of
identity, this requirement cannot be met. However, maintaining that God and the
idea of God are one and the same not only fulfills this requirement, but is
also independently motivated. I also briefly consider how the thesis that God
and the idea of God are one and the same affords us with positive insights
concerning the nature of this relation.
[Cf. Philpapers
& Academia.edu]